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In Defense of Dissentst
by
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.*
I am a little afraid that students may find boring the subject that I
have chosen for this lecture. But stick with me until I get finished.
The subject is, "In Defense of Dissents." In all candor, I ought to
confess that one reason I chose that title is that the sixteen opinions I
wrote some twenty-seven years ago during my first term on the Court
did not include a single dissent. Of my fifty-six opinions last term,
forty-two were dissents. Under the circumstances, because the great
Judge Tobriner also had a view of dissents that was not much
different from mine, I thought I would try to tell you why I think they
serve a very important purpose indeed.
It is an enormous pleasure for me to be here today, honoring the
life and great works of Mathew Tobriner. Such were his
accomplishments that my good friend Judge Skelly Wright, who gave
the inaugural Tobriner Lecture here two years ago, began his lecture
with a confession. He said that he had not, until recently, fully
appreciated the importance of state courts and state judges. Skelly
and I have been friends for a great many years, and he knew that I
had served on the Supreme Court of New Jersey and thus had some
ideas about the value of state judges.
Mathew Tobriner was, as Chief Justice Bird described him three
years ago in a moving tribute, an exceptional public servant and a
great legal scholar. A full appreciation of his years on the bench is
not, of course, what you who knew him so well expect from me today.
But I was struck by the fact that the universally laudatory assessments
of him are by no means limited to discussions of Justice Tobriner's
many noteworthy opinions for the California Supreme Court. The
t This article was first published in 37 Hastings L.J. 427 (1986). For citation purposes,
please refer to the original source of the material.
*Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
These remarks were delivered as the Third Annual Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial
Lecture at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, on November 18,
1985. The author wishes to thank the editors and staff of The Hastings Law Journal, who
assisted with the research for this lecture.
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deservedly famous case, for example, of People v. Dorado'
foreshadowed Miranda v. Arizona2 in our Court by holding that the
right to counsel in a criminal proceeding was not dependent upon the
accused's request for a lawyer. But nearly every appreciation of
Justice Tobriner also praises his fifty-eight dissents, notably In re
Tucker,3 defining the due process rights of parolees; and Swoap v.
Superior Court,4 which involved the constitutionality of a state statute
requiring the adult offspring of a recipient of state aid to reimburse
the state for the payments received by the parent; and, finally, the
very famous Bakke v. Regents of the University of California,5 in
which Justice Tobriner urged the court to distinguish between
invidious discrimination and benign racial classifications. Now, why
do we care about these dissents? After all, none of them "made" law;
they did not ensure that parolees would be treated with a modicum of
respect; they did not provide benefits to a needy person or advance
the rights of those historically denied equal rights and treatment. The
dissents are, however, critical to an understanding of the justice. Just
as we judge people by their enemies, as well as their friends, their
dislikes as well as their likes, the principles they reject as well as the
values they affirmatively maintain, so do we look at judges' dissents,
as well as their decisions for the court, as we evaluate judicial careers.
Why do judges dissent? Not many years ago, the writer Joan
Didion, a Californian, wrote an elegant essay for the New York
Times. The question she addressed, and the title of her essay, was
"Why I Write." She said:
Of course I stole the title... from George Orwell. One reason I
stole it was that I like the sound of the words: Why I Write. There
you have three short unambiguous words that share a sound, and
the sound they share is this:
I
I
I
In many ways writing is the act of saying I, of imposing oneself
upon other people, of saying listen to me, see it my way, change your
mind.6
No doubt, there are those who believe that judges-and
particularly dissenting judges-write to hear themselves say, as it
were, I I I. And no doubt, there are also those who believe that judges
1. 62 Cal. 2d 338,398 P.2d 361,42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. 5 Cal. 3d 171, 184, 486 P.2d 657, 665, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761,769 (1971).
4. 10 Cal. 3d 490,511,516 P.2d 840, 854, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 140 (1973).
5. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 64,553 P.2d 1152, 1172,132 Cal. Rptr. 680,700 (1976), affd in part &
rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1976 § 7 (Book Review), at 2 (emphasis in original).
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are, like Joan Didion, primarily engaged in the writing of fiction. I
cannot agree with either of those propositions.
Of course, we know why judges write opinions. It is through the
written word that decisions are communicated, that mandates issue.
But why dissent? What does a judge, whether a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of
California, hope to accomplish by dissenting? After all, the law is the
law, and in our system, whether in the legislature or the judiciary, it is
made by those who command the majority. As the distinguished legal
philosopher H.L.A. Hart declared, "A supreme tribunal has the last
word in saying what the law is and, when it has said it, the statement
that the court was 'wrong' has no consequences within the system: no
one's rights or duties are thereby altered."'7 In view of this reality,
some contend that the dissent is an exercise in futility, or, worse still,
a "cloud" on the majority decision that detracts from the legitimacy
that the law requires and from the prestige of the institution that
issues the law. Learned Hand complained that a dissenting opinion
"cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of
a bench of judges so largely depends." 8 Even Justice Holmes, the
Great Dissenter himself, remarked in his first dissent on the Court
that dissents are generally "useless" and "undesirable." 9 And more
recently, Justice Potter Stewart has labeled dissents "subversive
literature." Why, then, does a judge hold out?
Very real tensions sometimes emerge when one confronts a
colleague with a dissent. After all, collegiality is important; unanimity
does have value; feelings must be respected. I doubt that many judges,
however, would try to demean a dissent as did a famous Master of the
Rolls in England, presiding on a three-judge panel. After hearing a
half hour argument, he turned to his colleague on his right and said,
"John, haven't we heard enough of this-surely we must allow this
appeal." "Oh no, Chief," said John, "I couldn't possibly vote to do
that." "Oh well, John," said the Master of the Rolls, "you're entitled
to be mistaken." He then turned to his colleague on the left. "Tom,"
he said, "surely you agree that this appeal must be allowed." "Oh no,
Chief," said Tom, "I emphatically agree with John." "Well then,"
said the Master of the Rolls, "the appeal will be allowed and you two
argue between yourselves who will write the dissent."
It seems that to explain why a dissenter holds out, we should
examine some of the many different functions of dissents. Not only
are all dissents not created equal, but they are not intended to be so.
In other words, to answer "why write," one must first define precisely
7. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138 (1961).
8. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958).
9. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,400 (1904).
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what it is that is being written. I do not have an exhaustive list, but let
me at least suggest some diverse roles that may be served by a dissent.
If some of this gives you the impression that I am defending dissents,
you are right.
In its most straightforward incarnation, the dissent demonstrates
flaws the author perceives in the majority's legal analysis. It is offered
as a corrective-in the hope that the Court will mend the error of its
ways in a later case. Oliver Cromwell captured the thrust of that type
of dissent when he pleaded to the General Assembly of the Church of
Scotland in 1650, "Brethren, by the bowels of Christ I beseech you,
bethink you that you may be mistaken."10 But the dissent is often
more than just a plea; it safeguards the integrity of the judicial
decision-making process by keeping the majority accountable for the
rationale and consequences of its decision. Karl Llewellyn, who was
critical of the frequency with which Supreme Court Justices, of all
courts, dissented, grudgingly acknowledged the importance of that
role, characterizing it as "rid[ing] herd on the majority."" At the
heart of that function is the critical recognition that vigorous debate
improves the final product by forcing the prevailing side to deal with
the hardest questions urged by the losing side. In this sense, this
function reflects the conviction that the best way to find the truth is to
go looking for it in the marketplace of ideas. It is as if the opinions of
the Court-both for majority and dissent-were the product of a
judicial town meeting.
The dissent is also commonly used to emphasize the limits of a
majority decision that sweeps, so far as the dissenters are concerned,
unnecessarily broadly-a sort of "damage control" mechanism. Along
the same lines, a dissent sometimes is designed to furnish litigants and
lower courts with practical guidance-such as ways of distinguishing
subsequent cases. It may also hint that the litigant might more
fruitfully seek relief in a different forum-such as the state courts. I
have done that on occasion. Moreover, in this present era of
expanding state court protection of individual liberties, 2 in my view,
probably the most important development in constitutional
jurisprudence today, dissents from federal courts may increasingly
offer state courts legal theories that may be relevant to the
interpretation of their own state constitutions.
The most enduring dissents, however, are the ones in which the
authors speak, as the writer Alan Barth expressed it, as "Prophets
10. L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 103 (1985).
11. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26 (1960).
12. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L REV. 489 (1977).
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with Honor."'1 3 These are the dissents that often reveal the perceived
congruence between the Constitution and the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"' 4 and that seek
to sow seeds for future harvest. These are the dissents that soar with
passion and ring with rhetoric. These are the dissents that, at their
best, straddle the worlds of literature and law.
While it is relatively easy to describe the principal functions of
dissents, it is often difficult to classify individual dissents, particularly
the great ones, as belonging to one category or another; rather, they
operate on several levels simultaneously. For example, the first
Justice Harlan's remarkable dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson5 is at once
prophetic and expressive of the Justice's constitutional vision, and, at
the same time, a careful and methodical refutation on the majority's
legal analysis in that case.
In this masterful dissent, the Justice said that "in view of the
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is color-blind .... 1 6 Justice Harlan also foretold, with
unfortunate accuracy, the consequences of the majority's position.
Said he, the Plessy decision would:
not only stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating,
upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but will encourage the
belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the
beneficient purposes which the people of the United States had in
view when they adopted the recent amendments of the
Constitution. . . .17
He addressed, and dismissed as erroneous, the majority's
reliance on precedents. "Those decisions," he declared:
cannot be guides in the era introduced by the recent amendments
of the supreme law, which established universal civil freedom, gave
citizenship to all born or naturalized in the United States and
residing here, obliterated the race line from our systems of
governments. . . and placed our free institutions upon the broad
and sure foundation of the equality of all men before the law.'8
Justice Harlan, in that dissent, is the quintessential voice crying
in the wilderness. In rejecting the Court's view that so-called separate
but equal facilities did not violate the Constitution, Justice Harlan
stood alone; not a single other justice joined him. In his appeal to the
13. A. BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR: GREAT DISSENTS AND GREAT DISSENTERS
IN THE SUPREME COURT (1974).
14. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,101 (1958).
15. 163 U.S. 537,552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 559
17. Id. at 560.
18. Id. at 563.
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future, Justice Harlan transcended, without slighting, mechanical
legal analysis; he sought to announce fundamental constitutional
truths as well. He spoke not only to his peers, but to his society, and,
more important, across time to later generations. He was, in this
sense, a secular prophet, and we continue, long after Plessy and long
even after Brown v. Board of Education,19 to benefit from his wisdom
and courage.
From what source did Justice Harlan derive the right to stand
against the collective judgment of his brethren in Plessy? We may ask
the same question of Justice Holmes in Abrams;20 of Justice Brandeis
in Olmstead;21 of Justice Stone in Gobitis;22 of Justice Jackson in
Korematsu;23 of Justice Black in Adamson;2 4 or of the second Justice
Harlan in Poe v. Ullman;2 to name but a few of the most famous and
powerful dissents of this century. And surely, you may ask the same
question of me. How do I justify adhering to my essentially
immutable positions on obscenity, the death penalty, the proper test
for double jeopardy, and on the eleventh amendment? For me, the
answer resides in the nature of the Supreme Court's role.
The Court is something of a paradox-it is at once the whole and
its constituent parts. The very words "the Court" mean
simultaneously the entity and its members. Generally, critics of
dissent advocate the primacy of the unit over its members and argue
that the Court is most "legitimate," most true to its intended role,
when it speaks with a single voice. Individual justices are urged to
yield their views to the paramount need for unity. It is true that
unanimity underscores the gravity of a constitutional imperative-
witness Brown v. Board of Education26 and Cooper v. Aaron.27 But,
unanimity is not in itself a judicial virtue.
Indeed, history shows that nearly absolute unanimity enjoyed
only a brief period of preeminence in the Supreme Court. Until John
Marshall became Chief Justice, the Court followed the custom of the
King's Bench and announced its decisions through the seriatim
opinions of its members 28 Chief Justice Marshall broke with the
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting)
23. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,242 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
24. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
25. 367 U.S. 497,522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
28. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial
Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 192 (1959). The old English practice of issuing
seriatim opinions by each judge has also had some modem supporters. Justice Frankfurter,
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
English tradition and adopted the practice of announcing judgments
of the Court in a single opinion.29 At first, these opinions were always
delivered by Chief Justice Marshall himself, and were virtually always
unanimous. Unanimity was consciously pursued and disagreements
were deliberately kept private. Indeed, Marshall delivered a number
of opinions which, not only did he not write, but which were contrary
to his own judgment and vote at conference.30
This new practice, however, was of great symbolic and practical
significance at the time. Remember the context of the times when the
practice was introduced. As one commentator has observed, when
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, "[h]e did not propose to
announce only the views of John Marshall, Federalist of Virginia."
Rather, "he intended that the words he wrote should bear the
imprimatur of the Supreme Court of the United States. For the first
time, the Court as a judicial unit had been committed to an opinion-
a ratio decidendi-in support of its judgments."' This change in
custom at the time consolidated the authority of the Court and aided
in the general recognition of the Third Branch as co-equal partner
with the other branches. Not surprisingly, not everyone was pleased
with the new practice. Thomas Jefferson, who also was a lawyer, was,
of course, conversant with the English custom, and was angrily
trenchant in his criticism. He wrote that "[a]n opinion is huddled up
in conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if unanimous,
and with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty
chief judge, who sophisticates the law to his own mind, by the turn of
his own reasoning. '32 In other words, Marshall had shut down the
marketplace of ideas.
Of course, Jefferson was overstating matters a bit. In fact,
unanimity remained the rule only for the first four years of Marshall's
in one of his first opinions upon joining the Court in 1939, explained in a concurring
opinion that:
I join in the Court's opinion but deem it appropriate to add a few remarks. The
volume of the Court's business has long since made impossible the early healthy
practice whereby the Justices gave expression to individual opinions. But the old
tradition still has relevance when an important shift in constitutional doctrine is
announced after a reconstruction in the membership of the Court.
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
29. ZoBell, supra note 28, at 193.
30. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts,
1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 648 n.24 (1982); Roper, Judicial Unanimity and the
Marshall Court-A Road to Reappraisal, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119 (1965); ZoBell,
supra note 28, at 193 n.41.
31. ZoBell, supra note 28, at 193 (footnote omitted).
32. Letter from John Marshall to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25,1820), quoted in ZoBell,
supra note 28, at 194.
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Chief Justiceship, and during that period only one, one-sentence
concurrence was delivered, and that by Justice Chase.33 But, in 1804
Justice William Johnson arrived on the Court from the state appellate
court of South Carolina. He tried to perpetuate the seriatim practice
of his state court and issued a substantial concurrence in one of the
first cases in which he participated. And his colleagues were stunned.
Johnson later described their reaction in a letter to Jefferson. "Some
Case soon occurred," he wrote:
in which I differed from my Brethren, and I felt it a thing of Course
to deliver my Opinion. But, during the rest of the Session I heard
nothing but lectures on the Indecency of Judges cutting at each
other, and the Loss of Reputation which the Virginia appellate
Court had sustained by pursuing such a Course.34
Nonetheless, the short-lived tradition of unanimity had been
broken, and, in 1806, Justice Paterson delivered the first true dissent
from a judgment and opinion of the Court in Simms v. Slacum.35 As
one historian has observed, considerably understating the case, since
that time "dissents were never again a rarity. ' 36 Even Chief Justice
Marshall filed dissents from the opinions of the Court during his
closing years of Bench.37
What, then, should we make of modem critics of dissents?
Charles Evans Hughes answered that question sixty years ago and I
think what he said then is as true today. He said:
When unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice of conviction, it
strongly commends the decision to public confidence. But
unanimity which is merely formal, which is recorded at the expense
of strong, conflicting views, is not desirable in a court of last resort,
whatever may be the effect upon public opinion at the time [the
case is announced]. This is so because what must ultimately sustain
the court in public confidence is the character and independence of
the judges. They are not there simply to decide cases, but to decide
them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be
regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that their
independence should be maintained and recognized than that
unanimity should be secured through its sacrifice.38
In Chief Justice Hughes' view, and in my own, justices do have
an obligation to bring their individual intellects to bear on the issues
that come before the Court. This does not mean that a justice has an
absolute duty to publish trivial disagreements with the majority.
33. ZoBell, supra note 28, at 194.
34. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in
ZoBell, supra note 28, at 195.
35. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 300, 309 (1806) (Paterson, J., dissenting).
36. ZoBell, supra note 28, at 196.
37. Id.
38. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OFTHE UNITED STATES 67-68 (1928).
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Dissent for its own sake has no value, and can threaten the
collegiality of the bench. However, where significant and deeply held
disagreement exists, members of the Court have a responsibility to
articulate it. This is why, when I dissent, I always say why I am doing
so. Simply to say, "I dissent," I will not do.
I elevate this responsibility to an obligation because in our legal
system judges have no power to declare law. That is to say, a court
may not simply announce, without more, that it has adopted a rule to
which all must adhere. That, of course, is the province of the
legislature. Courts derive legal principles, and have a duty to explain
why and how a given rule has come to be. This requirement serves a
function within the judicial process similar to that served by the
electoral process with regard to the political branches of government.
It restrains judges and keeps them accountable to the law and to the
principles that are the source of judicial authority. The integrity of the
process through which a rule is forged and fashioned is as important
as the result itself; if it were not, the legitimacy of the rule would be
doubtful. Dissents contribute to the integrity of the process, not only
by directing attention to perceived difficulties with the majority's
opinion, but, to turn one more time to metaphor, also by contributing
to the marketplace of competing ideas.
This is not to say that stare decisis is of little consequence. As
Justice Roberts noted in Smith v. Allwright,39 constitutional
adjudication is not in "the same class as a restricted railroad ticket,
good for this day and train only."40 An opinion of the Court does, and
should, carry considerable weight in subsequent cases. But stare
decisis merely provides the background for judicial development of
the law. As Chief Justice Taney observed, the authority of the Court's
construction of the Constitution ultimately "depend[s] altogether on
the force of the reasoning by which it is supported."'41 A dissent
challenges the reasoning of the majority, tests its authority and
establishes a benchmark against which the majority's reasoning can
continue to be evaluated, and perhaps, in time, superseded. This
supersession may take only three years, as it did when the Court
overruled Gobitis42 in Barnette;43 it may take twenty years, as it did
when the Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhar44 in Darby;45 it may
take sixty years as it did when we overruled Plessy in Brown. The
39. 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 669.
41. Passenger cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,470 (1849).
42. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overrule4 West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
43. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
44. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
45. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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time periods in which dissents ripen into majority opinions depend on
societal developments and the foresight of individual justices, and
thus vary. Most dissents never "ripen" and do not deserve to. But it is
not the hope of eventual adoption by a majority that alone justifies
dissent. For simply by infusing different ideas and methods of analysis
into judicial decision-making, dissents prevent that process from
becoming rigid or stale. And, each time the Court revisits an issue,
the justices are forced by a dissent to reconsider the fundamental
questions and to rethink the result.
I must add a word about a special kind of dissent: the repeated
dissent in which a justice refuses to yield to the views of the majority
although persistently rebuffed by them. For example, Justice Holmes
adhered through the years to his views about the evils of substantive
due process, as did Justices Black and Douglas to their views
regarding the absolute command of the first amendment. And as I
said earlier, I adhere to positions on the issues of capital punishment,
the eleventh amendment, and obscenity, which I developed over
many years and after much troubling thought. On the death penalty,
for example, as I interpret the eighth amendment, its prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments embodies to a unique degree
moral principles that substantively restrain the punishments
governments of our civilized society may impose on those convicted
of capital offenses. Foremost among the moral principles inherent in
the constitutional prohibition is the primary principle that the state,
even as it punishes, must treat its citizens in a manner consistent with
their intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment must not be so
severe as to be utterly and irreversibly degrading the very essence of
human dignity. For, as Justice Tobriner too believed, all legal
decisions should advance, not degrade, human dignity. Death for
whatever crime and under all circumstances is a truly awesome thing.
The calculated killing of a human being by the state involves, by its
very nature, an absolute denial of the executed person's humanity.
The most vile murder does not, in my view, release the state from
constitutional restraints on the destruction of human dignity. Yet an
executed person has lost the very right to have rights, now or ever.
For me, then, the fatal constitutional infirmity of capital punishment
is that it treats members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects
to be toyed with and discarded. It is, in other words, "cruel and
unusual" punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.
This is an interpretation to which a majority of my fellow
justices-not to mention, it would seem, a majority of my fellow
countrymen-do not subscribe. Perhaps you find my adherence to it,
and my recurrent publication of it, simply contrary, tiresome, or
quixotic. Or perhaps you see in it a refusal to abide by the judicial
principle of stare decisis, obedience to precedent. In my judgment,
[Vol. 50
however, the unique interpretive role of the Supreme Court with
respect to the Constitution demands some flexibility with respect to
the call of stare decisis. Because we Justices of the United States
Supreme Court are the last word on the meaning of the Constitution,
our views must be subject to revision over time, or the Constitution
falls captive to the anachronistic views of long-gone generations. Of
course the judge should seek out the community's interpretation of
the constitutional text. Yet, in my judgment, when a justice perceives
an interpretation of the text to have departed so far from its essential
meaning, that justice is bound, by a larger constitutional duty to the
community, to expose the departure and point toward a different
path.
This kind of dissent, in which a judge persists in articulating a
minority view of the law in case after case presenting the same issue,
seeks to do more than simply offer an alternative analysis-that could
be done in a single dissent and does not require repetition. Rather,
this type of dissent constitutes a statement by the judge as an
individual: "Here I draw the line." Of course, as a member of a court,
one's general duty is to acquiesce in the rulings of that court and to
take up the battle behind the court's new barricades. But it would be
a great mistake to confuse this unquestioned duty to obey and respect
the law with an imagined obligation to subsume entirely one's own
views of constitutional imperatives to the views of the majority. None
of us, lawyer or layman, teacher or student in our society must ever
feel that to express a conviction, honestly and sincerely maintained, is
to violate some unwritten law of manners or decorum. We are a free
and vital people because we not only allow, we encourage debate, and
because we do not shut down communication as soon as a decision is
reached. As law-abiders, we accept the conclusions of our
decision-making bodies as binding, but we also know that our right to
continue to challenge the wisdom of that result must be accepted by
those who disagree with us. So we debate and discuss and contend
and always we argue. If we are right, we generally prevail. The
process enriches all of us, and it is available to, and employed by,
individuals and groups representing all viewpoints and perspectives.
I hope that what I have said does not sound like too
individualistic a justification of the dissent. No one has any duty
simply to make noise. Rather, the obligation that all of us, as
American citizens have, and that judges, as adjudicators, particularly
feel, is to speak up when we are convinced that the fundamental law
of our Constitution requires a given result. I cannot believe that this is
a controversial statement. The right to dissent is one of the great and
cherished freedoms that we enjoy by reason of the excellent accident
of our American births.
Through dynamic interaction among members of the present
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Court and through dialogue across time with the future Court, we
ensure the continuing contemporary relevance and hence vitality of
the principles of our fundamental charter. Each justice must be an
active participant, and, when necessary, must write separately to
record his or her thinking. Writing, then, is not an egoistic act-it is
duty. Saying, "listen to me, see it my way, change your mind," is not
self-indulgence-it is very hard work that we cannot shirk.
